INTRODUCTION This paper is, first, an attempt to show how military rules in Mauritania and Sudan have sharpened the racial contradictions between African and Arab populations in the two countries.
This has been undermining the possibilities for a peaceful progress towards real democratisation as is currently happening in many other African countries, including South Africa. Second, attempts will be made to present the views of the ruling regimes and political groups of the North as well as those of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Finally, put forwards some recommendations, which I hope will contribute to the struggle for peace and democracy in Mauritania and Sudan.

Mauritania and Sudan are situated geographically and culturally on the divide between arabised Africans of the north and the Africans of the South. The interaction of these two groups breeds the complex cultural diversity as well as the ethnic tensions in the two countries. The original inhabitants of these areas were Africans. Black Mauritanians were one of the founders of the Empires of Ghana (600- 1706), Mali (1706-1350) and Songhai (1350-1585). Sudanese were part of Ancient Egypt. When Egypt was destroyed they founded Nubia and Funj kingdoms, which survived up to the 19 century. The Arab influx into the area began following the emergence of Islam in Arabia in the 7th century. As northern Sudan was invaded via Egypt in 1820 by Muhammad Ali, Othman governor of Egypt, northern Mauritania was raided via Morocco by the Almoravid Berbers in the 16th century (D. Daxxel, 1989).
Engalo-Egyptian colonisation of Sudan and France's of Mauritania did a lot to place political power under Arab control in the two countries.

THE POPULATIONS Since independence, both nations have been suffering from massive economic and social problems created by violent political and sectarian regimes, ethnic tensions as well as ecological catastrophes of the Sahel. Though with just 2 million people and 1037000 square km, the demographic situation in Mauritania is a taboo as successive Arab regimes try to build the myth that the country is exclusively Arab. Therefore, the results of the exhaustive population census taken in 1976-77 or the one conducted in 1988 with help fom the World Bank and UN have never been published. Reseachers usually depend on surveys made, respectively, by "la Societe d'études de dévelopement économique et social", a French research centre, and by "la Mission socioéconomique de la Vallée du Fleuve Sénegal", an international group. The combination of the results obtained by these two instititions and statistical extrapolations suggest that 45% of population is black Africans, Fulani, Soninke and Wolof, 30% Arabo-Berbers and 25% black slaves (Haratine) (Bourgi& Weiss,1989).

Sudan is Africa's largest country with over 2 million square km and 23 million people. The last census which gathered information about the size of the different ethnic groups in 1955-56 estimated that 40% were "Arabs"living mainly in the central regions of the North, 30% Nubians, Beja and Ingessana, living in the North, East and West plus 30% Nilotic groups of the Dinkas and Nuer in the South. (Africa Watch, 1990). More than 50% of the people are Muslims, while the rest follow African religion or Christianity. Attempts to deny the cultural reality of the two countries by Arab regimes in both countries have put the existance of Mauritania and Sudan as sovereign nations at stake.

To rescue Mauritania and Sudan from imminent disintegration, the racial and sectarian issues, resulting from acute identity crisis, have to be solved. Such a solution should be based on the principle of national unity within the cultural diversities in the two countries. Equal treatment of the diverse groups by public persons and organs should be absolute (D. Daxxel, 1989). This presupposes real democracy within a federal form of government, which can house and permit the various communities to manage national, regional or local matters that affect them directly. In this way each group would contribute to the nation as a whole as well as gain from the contribution of the others. The Africans have no problem in respecting the Arabs to use and promote their culture at all levels as well as maintain contact with the Arab World so long as this does not harm their vital interest. In return they demand the same from their Arab compatriots.

Given far sighted national vision, socioenomic philosophy, political courage and ideological maturity Sudanese and Mauritanian shall be able to sit together and answer questions such as to why there has developed a culture of dictatorship, racial inquality, chronic civil war, famine and economic underdevelopment. Once they answer these questions honestly they would find that it is possible to agree on a lasting solution to the crises that have beset their nations since the two ethnic groups came into contact with one another. This is what both FLAM and SPLA have been advocating and fighting for since their inception in 1983. Both movements are national in character and democratic in scope. They consider federalism to be the most appropriate government system for the cultural diversity as well as a guarantee against dictatorship. Due to its decentralist nature, real federalism is incompatible with dictatorships (W.S. Livingston,1988). Otherwise, it will be somehow premature to talk about democratisation in Mauritania and Sudan. The repeated failure of democratic experiments in Sudan is proof enough (M. Khalid, 1987). Even architects of Apartheid, like F. De Klerk, have realised that racism and democracy are antithesis.

WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE OAU AND ARAB LEAGUE PLAY? The OAU (minus its Arab member states) and the Arab League should participate in any negociation for a solution to the conflict in Sudan and Mauritania. Because the conflict is connected to the whole issue of Afro-Arab relations. Thus, both forums should join hands in order to heir kids and their way of life or the confiscation of their lands became real targets. People were either murdered or illegally detained while more than 200 000 were deported out of their country to refugee camps in Senegal or Mali between 1989 and 1990.

Taya's terror campaign began in September 1986, when he overreacted to the publication by FLAM of the Manifesto of the Oppressed Negro Mauritanians in April 1986. More than a hundred black intellectuals were arrested, charged with fomenting national discord and sentenced to long term imprisonment with hard labour in September 1986. Their only crime was to list up the injustices suffered by blacks under Arab rule, and to call on the authorities as well as other political forces to a national dialogue to address the root cause of these historical injustices before it was too late.

Taya was to accelerate his war on blacks in October 1987, when he mounted a massive purge and detention of African army personnel. Three black officers were summarily executed after being falsely accused of plotting to overthrow the regime. Four black political activists died of torture at Walata in 1988. Taya's anti-black campaign culminated in the 1989-90 deportation of black Mauritanians to Senegal and Mali following a border conflict with Senegal in 1989. This conflict is a direct result of the Mauritanian crisis which has begun to spill over to neighbouring countries. Again Taya launched a new operation to detain without charge or trial 4000 blacks during the last months of 1990. 457 persons were murdered in government custody. The murderers were apparently celebrating in advance a promised victory by Saddam in what he termed as "the mother of all battles". This speculation was made more valid when the government ordered the release of black political prisoners on the same day Saddam admited his defeat (Bilaal, No. 2/1991).

SUDAN UNDER GENERAL EL BASHIR The political picture in Sudan under Gen. Omar el Bashir, who seized power in Sudan on June 30th 1989, is as bleak as that of Mauritania, particularly with regard to the concentration of political power in the hands of one man who mobilises his own community to wage war on the other. What makes this one particularly dangerous is the fact that it is an admixture of raw military rule and fanatical Muslim fundementalism that is both committed to forced arabisation and islamisation of Sudan by the sword. This evil alliance has accelerated the civil war in the South where it uses famine as a weapon of terror. Moreover, the disputed Shari'a laws are being implemented, free political activities banned and women are being intimidated and harassed in order to force them back to the kitchen (The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1991).

MILITARY RULE IN MAURITANIA AND SUDAN

A military coup d'etat means that the armed forces of a country, relying on their virtual monopoly of the means of violence, assume control of the central government and that this seizing of power is accomplished in a sudden and rather unexpected fashion (S. Wiking, 1983).
Governments can also be toppled as a results of direct foreign intervention, as happened several times in Tchad ,or popular uprisings like those in Sudan in 1964 and 1985, as well as civil wars as happened recently in Ethiopia, Somalia and Liberia. Mauritania has experienced two successful coups and two palace coups as well as several coup attempts, since the army deposed the country's first president, Mokhtar Ould Daddah on July 10th 1978. Sudan was the first black African country and the second in the continent, after the 1952 in Egypt, to experience a military coup in 1958. This was followed by three more coups in 1969, 1985 and 1989, and several bloody coup attempts.

BACKGROUNDS BEHIND THE COUPS As early as in 1956, Cheikh Anta Diop warned that unless we took care the African continent upon independence would go down the road of "South Americanisation" (CH.A. Diop, 1974) And again in 1977, he noted that the political instability of the continent had become a reality to the point that we couldn`t even talk about "balkanisation" since the Balkan regimes were stable, whereas in Africa we had a change of regime almost every week or month (ibid) Following the first coup in Mauritania in 1978, government reshuffles, palace coups and coup attempts were so routine that the Mauritanian ambassador to Qatar, Samba Jully, said that he had given up writing names of presidents or ministers when sending reports home as the concerned would likely have lost his job before the reports reached him. Orders to hang pictures of members of the Comite Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN) at the entrance of Mauritanian embassies, proved impossible.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS BEHIND THE COUPS? Coups are usually staged in the name of economic reform and social justice, yet they seldom accomplish either. Most coups were nonetheless welcomed by the African citizenery whose lives were already so difficult that any change was viewed as an agreeable alternative. Such desperate attitudes have been the case in Mauritania and Sudan where coups have always been met with jubilations, on one hand for getting rid of the old oppressors and on the other a hope that the new regime would do something to end the political nightmare it has just inherited from the demised regime(s). As David Lamb put it " power is merely transferred within an inner circle of cousins, friends and soldiers" (D. Lamb, 1983,).

This is very true to the situation in Mauritania and Sudan, where army officers are recruited and promoted along ethnic and sectarian lines to preserve the status quo. This is what Cheikh Anta Diopdescribed as the lack of national leaderships which can set an example which would make coups more difficult. Thus, when the only organised force in the country- the army- ceases to respect the civilians in power, it will seize power for itself (Ch.A. Diop, 1974).
However, the army takeover only perpetuates the same evils it pretended to eliminate, because the army has not been educated along patriotic and political lines. The army is neither disposed, trained nor qualified to run governments. Its job should be to defend national sovreignty, carry out rapid emergency operations, construct bridges, roads and railways as well as save the environment etc. African armies have become mere tools of civilian wielding power, for their very narrow interests. Without such army backing, Apartheid-like minority regimes would have never survived in Mauritania or Sudan. So, instead of doing the dirty job for corrupt politicians, the soldiers do it for themselves to the exclusion of their rivals. It doesn't need much experience or intelligence to do a bad job and do it badly.

In addition to the racial, sectarian and political factors behind the coups, foreign interests in Mauritania and Sudan often play a direct role in coups as well as their chances for survival.
Nimeiri's 1969 coup was said to be inspired and supported by Egypt, while Ould Taya's coup in 1984, was apparently executed with the help or at least blessing from France.
This coup followed a visit to Mauritania by Francois Mitterand, who was escorted on a desert safari by the army-chief of staff, Taya. Upon his return to France, Mitterand persuaded Haidalla over telephone to join him at the Francophone summit in Burundi, thus Taya took the chance to jumped onto Haidalla's seat (Liberation, 1984).

THE FIRST COUPS:
SALECK-BOUCEIF As already cited above, Sudan's first military coup took place on November 17th 1956, whereas Mauritania's occured on July 10th 1978. The former was led by Gen. Ibrahim Abbud whereas the latter by Lt.Col. Ould Saleck, both were chief of staff in their respective countries. The coup in Mauritania did replace the one party regime of Mokhtar Ould Daddah whose own "Parti du Peuple Mauritanien" had controlled political life since the country was created by France in 1960, while Abbud's coup came to fill the political vacuum following sectarian politicians' failure to agree on how to run Khartoum. The new military regimes followed the tradition of suspending the constitution, parliament, banning political parties and declaring state of emergency. In Mauritania, a "Comité Militaire du Redressement National" (CMRN) was set up to run the country.
In Sudan, it was the politicians themselves who invited the army to take over.
In Mauritania, the army claimed that it intervened in order to end corruption, to prevent economic ruin and division as well as to create democratic institutions. The new rulers declared that the Armed Forces were "the ultimate owners of national legitimacy" and the intervention resulted from "their belief in their responsibility". Despite the fact that the coup was essentially related to a desire to end Mauritania's involvement in the Sahara war, the intervention was not aiming at any radical change in Mauritania's internal affairs (S. Wiking, 1983).
However, the army did genuinely want to withdraw from the Sahara dispute in which it was exhausted by the Algerian/Libyan backed Polisario Front. Polisario was able to raid the capital Nouakchott twice on June 8th 1976 and on July 3rd 1977 as well as capture the mining town of Zouerate for several hours on April 30th 1977. Polisariso Secretary-General, El Ouali, was killed while leading the first raid on Nouakchott

Despite the defeat, the power position of the army increased enormously as a result of the war. Its numbers increased from 2000 men in 1976 to 18000 at the time of the coup in 1978. The army's share in GNP increased from 30% in 1976 to 40% in 1977. This increase came at a time when Polisario had effectively crippled the mineral export from the port of Nouadhibou, thus depriving Mauritania of over 80% of export income. Foreign debt increased from US$ 140 million in 1973 to 700 in 1978 while most development projects such as the copper mine at Akjoujt, pastoralist schemes in the South, the oil rafinery at Nouadhibou etc were practically put aside. The government was so broke that it had to borrow money from the local banks to pay its employees at the end of June 1978 (Piere Robert Baduel, 1990).

On the ethnic front, the Berbers who were reluctant to fight their brothers of the Sahara from the outset, became more opposed to the war as it claimed more lives. Prominent Berber Mauritanian politicians such as Ahmed Ould Baba Miski defected to the Polisario. The Negro Africans, whose members made up the bulk of the armed forces felt more and more that the war was an inter-Beydane (Arabo Berber) affair for which they had no reason to give their lives. More Berbers into the country, meant increased racism against them (D. Daxxel, 1989). The deployment of 9000 Moroccan troops in northern Mauritania together with a French air cover from bases in Dakar in 1977 discredited Ould Daddah further.

It was under these circumstances that the army intervened. The first periode was post Oud Daddah's period. It did not last long as Ould Saleck was deposed in a palace coup by Col Bouceif in April 1979. The only political move Saleck took during his rule was to set up a National Council which was supposed to prepare for a return to civilian. Black politicians boycotted the opening of the forum, because they were as usual under-represented: Out of 70 appointed members, only 10 were blacks. Bouceif was planning to revive alliance with Morocco and thereby start the Sahara war against the Polisario front while crushing student strikes at home. But he died in a plane crash near Dakar on May 27 1979. The strikes were staged by black students who demanded educational reforms so that African languages would be taught in schools on equal term with the newly imposed Arabic.

HAIDALLA Bouceif was succeeded by Col. Ould Haidalla from the Saharawi tribe of Rgeibat. His open support to the Polisario front was therefore attributed to this tribal connection. Haidalla's main problem was his lack of tribal base within the country to back his policies which swung more to the left than right. However, he managed to sign a peace treaty with the Polisario on August 5th, 1979 after renouncing all claim on the West Sahara and recognising the Saharawi right to self determination (A. Gerteiny, 1982). Haidalla introduced also Educational Reforms which recognised African languages to be taught in schools, he "abolished" slavery on July 5th 1980 and introduced Shari'a Law and established the Structure for the Education of the Masses in 1981. He futher appointed civilian Bneijara as prime minster between December 1980 and April 1981. Bneijara was sacked following a visit to Libya during which he signed a union treaty with Libiya on 18 April 1981, apparantly without consulting his chief (Pierre Robert Baduel, 1990).

SUDAN The "17th of November (1958) Coup" of Gen. Abbud was a handover by the then Prime Minister Abdalla Khailil of the Uuuma Party. The direct reason was said to be the danger of losing a vote of confidence in the parliamentary session to be held on 17th of November 1958 (S.A. Kabalo, 1988). Abbud declared that it was aimed at saving the nation from politicians' misrule (S. Wiking 1983) Both Sadiq Al Mahdi and Sayyid Al Mirgani supported the regime on the understanding that the army would not stay in power longer than necessary (Africa South of Sahara, 1991) Abbud assured the country that his aim was the restoration of stability and sound administration, and the fostering of cordial relations with the outside world, especially Egypt.

The coup came amid deep political division within the ruling sects in the North and threats of separation in the South and other marginalised regions. Southern deputies boycotted discussion on the draft constitution in May 1958 because it excluded the option of federation. On 16 June, Saturnino Lohure, the leader of the Federal Bloc, declared: "the South claims to federate with the North, a right that the South undoubtedly posses as a consequence of the principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to a free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides, directly or indirectly subjection of the South" h 1972 (Africa S.Sahara, 1991). Thus, the civil war in the South was settled on the basis of regional autonomy for the three Southern Provinces. A regional People's Assembly for the South was established at Juba with representatives in the national people's assembly in Khartoum and an executive council. This brought peace and stability between the South and North for the first time. Confidence between the two regions was on the point of being established when Nimeiri launched a campaign to destroy his only significant achievement. He violated his own constitution by dividing the South into three regions, dissolving the regional assembly and government and transferring southern troops to North. "In the course of his sixteen-year rule, Nimeiri had used and abused all ideologies, only religion was left for him. Thus, he conjured up his so called Islamic laws and ambushed the nation with the September decrees" (M. Khalid, 1987).

NIMEIRI'S FALL In March 1985, Nimeiri was to announce new hard measures to keep relations with the IMF. These measures led to the uprising in March, April 1985 which overthrew the dictator (S.A. Kabalo). Like the popular revolution in 1964, it aborted by the intervention of the Generals. On April 6th 1985, Nimeiri was replaced by a Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by the chief of staff and defence minister, Gen. Swar al Dahab and composed of top officers (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990). Nimeiri's regime was rapidly dismantled as the Sudanese Socialist Union and the hated Security Organisation were abolished. The generals claimed that they intervened to prevent bloodshed. However, "the truth of the matter about the fear of bloodshed is that if the people had taken over, they would have thrown the generals in jail and they would have been made to account for the crimes of the May regime" (J. Garang, 1987). Elections were held in the North in 1986 as the war continued in the South. Traditionalist parties returned to power just to repeat their old mistakes.

Over a three year period the Umma Party leader, Sadiq al- Mahdi, who had been prime minister between 1966 and 1967, led three coalition governments. The coalitions included all mainstream political parties in the country. On June 30th 1989, on the day that the cabinet was due to ratify the DUP-SPLA agreement for peace talks, there was a coup by Islamic fundamentalist officers. The coup was led by Gen. Omer el-Bashir, who immediately adopted a series of draconian measures (Africa Watch, 1990).

RACISM IN MAURITANIA AND SUDAN

According to Mauritanian and Sudanese laws it is illegal to discriminate against persons or
groups because of their race or colour. While both countries have ratified the African Charter

on Human and People's Rights (adopted on June 26th 1981), Mauritania has not ratified the main international treaties adopted by the General Assembly of the UN to protect human rights throughout the world, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966) and the Covenant against Torture and other cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted in 1984) (Amnesty International, 1990) By ratifying the African Charter both countries have undertaken to respect: The right to enjoy human and civil rights and freedoms without discrimination based on race, colour, language, sex, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. Nevertheless there are ample evidence that black people in both countries have been the victims of racial discriminations committed by successive Arab regimes, who have denied them not only the most basic cultural, social, political and economic rights, but the right to life and citizenship.

Mauritanian regimes have gone as far as to deny the existence of black people in the country. In an interview with Jeune Afrique on January 1st 1990, Ould Taya of Mauritania declared that "Mauritania cannot be in the process of arabisation as it is already an Arab country". In Sudan, "northern city-dwellers often depict the presence of people from the West and South around those cities as a "black cordon meant to suffocate the cities and delute their racial purity, which is a conspiracy hatched by some weird foreign power, such as African governments, the Christian Church and even Zionism against Arabism" (Mansour Khalid, 1987). Yet, each and every Arab regime that shoots itself into power will accuse its predecessor of endangering national unity. However, same regimes will describe any effort made by people of the South to improve their lot or react against northern racism, as anti-Arab "racism" (M. Khalid, 1987). The regimes cynically do exploit the war situation onto which they have plunged their nations to justify the suppression of democratic rights. The northerners wish to have the monopoly of both racism and anti-racism at the same time. Whereas Arab regimes commit their crimes with a good conscience by misusing Islam and mobilising Arab support, African countries turn deaf ear and blind eye (D. Daxxel 1989).

If anyone is in doubt about the official racism against black people in Mauritania and Sudan
should just consider that:

1. All the 1000 killed during a government organised massacre in Mauritania, or 700 massacred at el Jebelein in Sudan in 1989 happened to be black Africans. Blind killings of blacks have become routine in both countries,
2. There was not a single Arab among the 200 000 Mauritanian citizens who were deported to Senegal or Mali. In Sudan blacks have been driven away from their lands in the west by Arab settlers, supported Sudanese and Libyan governments (Africa Watch, 1990),
3. While black Mauritanians were being driven out of their homes to refugee camps, Arab refugees from Senegal, Mali or West Sahara were welcomed into Mauritania, where they were given citizenship and resettled on land whose rightful owners were deported. Sudan has generously allowed refugees from Ethiopia a free residence in Khartoum while deporting its black citizens from the national capital, Slavery is practiced exclusively by Arab Mauritanians and Sudanese on non Arab citizens in both countries, and 5. Upon the introduction of Shari'a laws in Mauritania and Sudan, respectively in 1980 and 1983, savage punishments like amputation, and flogging have mainly been applied on blacks by exclusively Arab judicial authorities in the two countries.

THE ORIGIN AND EFFECT OF RACISM IN MAURITANIA & SUDAN As was noted above, racism in both countries has its origin in the ways Arabs came into contact with black Africans. They came in various guises, as drought refugees, invaders, traders or missionaries. In reality all were after slaves and wealth for world domination. Black people had been enslaved in such a scale that the term black became synonym to slave in Arabic. Systematic destruction of black culture and civilisation became the order of the day whereever and whenever the Arabs gained foothold in the dark continent. They distorted and falsified black history and achievements while glorifying their own. Blacks were pushed to the bottom of the social, economic and political ladder.

Moreover, the Arabs exploited a provision in Islam, that allows the use of women captured during holy wars as concubines. This sexual exploitation of black women was not extended to black men for it was a one-way sexual process as the "master race" kept its own women "sacred" and seculeded behind the walls of their homes. (See the appendix, last p.) The outcome of these one-way process was the millions of coloured populations that spearhead wars on black Africa from Sudan to Mauritania. To prove how Arab they were, the mixed populations made hatred of Africans a ritual, and tried to surpass the whites in raiding for slaves. They often become hysterical if reminded of their bantu or "kaffir" blood (Ch. Williams, 1987).

The fact that Mauritania and Sudan are the only countries among the 21 member states of the Arab League which call themselves Islamic Republic or imposed Shari'a laws testifies to their desperate search for cultural refugee. It was this that led Mauritania into signing a union treaty with Libya on April 18th 1980. The fact that they did not even have a common border was not important. Likewise, Sudan has signed union pacts with both Egypt and Libya on a number of occasions, the last treaty was signed with Libya on March 1990. By contrast, neither of them has ever attempted to unite with any black African country.

These anti-black attitudes have created tensions along their common borders with black Africa as well as permanent internal civil strife between the so-called Arabs and black populations in the two countries. This is what Newsweek referred to as "an undeclared war simmering at the western end of the line dividing Arab North Africa from the African sub-Sahara. After Mauritanian herders trampled the fields of Senegalese farmers hundreds of people were slaughtered in Mauritania and nearly hundred in Senegal. About 300 000 more were displaced as black Africans fled or driven south from Mauritania and Arabic speakers rushed north from Senegal". "In the conflict there is an Arab against African element which is very dangerous for the rest of Africa", commented U.S Assistent Sec. of State for Africa, Herman Cohen (Newsweek, 12.2. 1990).

COLONIAL RULE As Mauritania was colonised via Senegal, Sudan was colonised through Egypt. Whereas Africans had more access, than their Arab compatriots, to modern education blacks in the South Sudan were deliberately isolated in accordance with the "Southern Policy" of the British, ostensibly to protect them from Arab abuse. By contrast, the French Governor of Mauritania, Mr. Chazal, not only allowed the Arabs to keep their former slaves, but encouraged them to hunt for more. He made an agreement with the Arabs in 1932 to regulate Tax on the slavery. The Arabs were required to pay tax on each slave they owned equivalent to one paid on five sheep/goats. At the time tax on such beast was 2.50 Francs, which meant that an Arab master paid on each slave 12.50 Francs (L. Hunkanrin, 1932). In addition, the Arabs were exempted from serving in the French army provided that they sent their slaves instead (Black children Manifesto, 1989).

DIVIDE AND RULE IN MAURITANIA In 1955-56, the French felt that "since it was necessary to set Africa free, it was preferable to split it up into mini-states, each of which would be forced to remain attached to the metropole ((Yves Person, 1982). As far as the artificial creation of Mauritania was concerned, the direct motive was to: -keep Algeria as part of France, - sabotage plans to form a West African federation grouping southern Mauritania with Senegal and Mali, -keep Morocco off by squeezing Mauritania there, - fight Pan Africanist political views harboured by Modibo Keita of Mali and Cheikhou Toure of Guinea and Nkruma of Ghana. As a result, French decreed that the capital shared by both Mauritania and Senegal at St Louis, split up and moved away from the border. The Senegalese administration was transferred to Dakar, whereas the Mauritanian to an empty desert spot, where Nouakchott was to be built as the capital of Mauritania in 1958. There was not even water to drink not to mention shelters or essential infrastructure. Dia Mamadou, the strong socialist prime minister of Senegal, who came from the border area, was gradually removed from power in favour of the pro-french Senghor. In Mauritania power was transferred to the Arab Ould Daddah, who was pro Arab but anti-Morrocan. In order to make sure that the Arabs controlled political, the French went as far as to publicly warned the Arabs that if they did not mobilise themselves polically the blacks were going to win the 1958 elections and thereby seize power (Livre Blanc,1991).

AND IN SUDAN The British were planning to form an East African federation made up of at least Uganda, Kenya and Southern Sudan. But the Kenyan Land and Freedom Revolution (Mau Mau) took the British by surprise and consequently destroyed their original plans of their East African federation. When they realised that they had to leave, the British were neither prepared to let Africans form their own federation, grant independence to South Sudan or even press for a federal system in Sudan. The result was to hand it over to agressive northern Arabs. This was apparantly promted by the desire to prevent Egypt from swallowing up northern Sudan. What the Arabs were not able to achieve via centuries of war, was handed over to them by the French or the British.

FROM COLONIAL RULE TO ARAB MISRULE Thus, for the black populations in Sudan and Mauritania, independence was a transition from colonial rule to Arab misrule. Like Portuguese colonialism, the weaker and more backwards colonists are the more violent they would be. Commenting on the conflict in Mauritania in 1989, the two spiritual leaders of the Tidianya Muslim sect in Senegal, Cheikh Mountaqa Tall and Abdoul Aziz Sy noted that: "the black people along the Senegal Valleey had always lived as one community on both sides of the River as their home land. Such was the case both before and during colonial rule, but now the Berber regime in Nouakchott has violated this historical rights by cutting our people into two".

DISCRIMINATION IN POLITICAL LIFE Like Sudan, political power has been concentrated in the hands of the beydane community, which has subjected the country's black population to gross human rights abuses and denied it equality of opportunity in every aspect of public life (Africa Watch, 1990). What is taking place in southern Mauritania is, in effect, an undeclared war, in which one community (Arab) is using the resources and power of the state against another (Amnesty, 1990). Blacks have been excluded from national, regional and local politics as well as in the armed forces. The tradition in both countries is to have 3 black ministers in every government. While the posts of sports, transports and public works are reserved for black Mauritanians, animal/mineral resources and public works have become the staple southern portfolios in Sudan. In Mauritania, local and regional governments in all black areas are put under agrressive Arab prefects and governors (Livre Blanc, 1991& J. Markakis, 1990 )

In foreign policy, both regimes do extra efforts to portray their nations as real Arab. This can explain the fact that while all Arab countries in Africa are represented at embassadorial level in Khartoum and Nouakchott, the 47 black African nations are represented by only 3 and 10 embassies in Nouakchott and Khartoum, respectively. There are only two black ambassadors in the Mauritanian missions abroad, and I am not aware of the existence of any southern ambassador representing Sudan abroad. This is the way successive Arab regimes want to present their countries to the outside world. As Mansour Khalid puts it: "They don't want to see their countries from inside, as they are, but what the Arabs think they should be when looking at them from outside". Such foreign policies are nothing but an extension of conflicting foreign policies of different Arab regimes (M. Khalid, 1990).

CULTURAL AND RACISM IN MAURITANIA As the British let the Arab North impose Arabic on the South Sudan in 1953, the French conspired with the Berber North to do the same in Mauritania in 1959. Ould Daddah reinforced this cultural imperialism by his (Bantu) Arabisation Acts of 1966 by which Arabic was imposed along with the French on all school children and made the first two years completely arabised. Thus, from the age of seven the African child has to battle with learning two foreign languages, both reflecting foreign cultures. In 1979, the PPM published a circular declaring "Arabisation of Mauritania is a long term objective that will lead to the full rehabiliation of our Arabic language and our culture" (Livre Blanc, 1991). Moreover, geograhical cites and cultural symbols are being arbised. All 13 regions in the country, except two, as well as all the districts and streets of the national capital have been given Arab or e history (Africa Watch, 1990)

HOW TO IMPOSE ONE'S CULTURE ON THE NEGRO? After qualifying the decision by African countries in the early 1960s to use latin characters in writing their languages as a very dangerous historical precedence, Muhi Edin al Sabir, Director of Alesco, (Arab League UNESCO) drew up a long list of strategic steps the Arab world should adopt in order to replace European cultural hegemony in black Africa with their own. They should: 1) collect and classify key books and documents on Africa and translate them into Arabic as well as write dictionaries, 2) make funds available to help African education institutions replace English and French with Arabic, 3) provide books and grants to Africans studying Arabic, 4) help Africans write their languages using Arabic characters if it is impossible to make them learn Arabic etc. (Muhidin Sabir, No.56 Oct. 1983). It is to be noted that this guy happens to be a Sudanese citizen.

MUSLIM OR ARAB NAMES? As a matter of fact the so-called Muslim names are nothing but authentic Arab names that were in use long before the coming of Islam. Prophet Muhammad did neither change his name nor did he order his followers to do so following their conversion to Islam apart from insulting names such as Abu Jahal or Abdu el Samse. As with the so-called Muslim names, Islamic or Christian heritage in Mauritania and Sudan are no more than what was collected around there by the invaders, who were not ashamed of attributing all that was good to themselves. This is a typical misuse of Islam for imperialist ends, for Islam is not the issue. It is just a pretext, or else black Mauritanians or Kurdish who are Muslims would not have needed to be killed by Arab regimes. As with all the other tragedies that had befallen them, Africans have primarily themselves to blame. Either they shy away from taking up the matter with the imperialists, sit down passively until it is too late, or actively participate in destroying their life base. Just look at what is going on in Sudan and Mauritania right now, and yet no African leader would say anything.

SLAVERY AND RACISM IN MAURITANIA Another aspect of racism in Mauritania and Sudan is classical slavery. In both countries, slavery is still rampant and is practised only on blacks by Arabs with active government support. Slavery was "abolished" several times in independent Mauritania, latest on July 5th, 1980. Yet the anti-Slavery Society's findings two years later as well as that of Africa Watch, ten years after the last abolition point to the existence of a minimum of 100 000 full time slaves plus 300.000 half slaves still being held by Arab Mauritanian. In his introductory remarks of the Anti-Slavery Society Report of 1982, John Mercer writes:

"The head of state from 1960 to 1978, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, kept slaves behind the presidential palace. The successive military committees which have controlled Mauritania since the coup d'etat in July 1978 have fluctuated between "a return to tradition"- implying amongst other aspects, that there would be no relaxation of slavery- and the decree of 5 July 1980, yet again "abolishing" slavery" (John Mercer, 1982).

Momamed Isa al Qadeeri, a Kuwaiti journalist, wrote in the Kuwaiti newspaper al Wattan on April 29th 1989, page 14: "At the end of my last visit to Mauritania, among the gifts given to me- which I strongly refused- by my Arab friends, was a black slave".

In its report titled: Mauritania Slavery Alive and Well, 10 Years after the Last Abolition, Africa Watch notes that: "Abolishing slavery which is deeply-rooted in Mauritania, is a difficult and long-term problem. Our criticism is not that the Mauritanian government has tried to eridicate slavery and failed, but that it has not tried at all. We are not aware of any significant practical steps taken by successive governments to fulfill the important responsibilities Mauritania undertook when it passed laws and ratified international agreements prohibiting slavery. Its persistence is largely explained by the fact that legislative enactments have not been accompanied by initiatives in the economic and social fields" ( Africa Watch, 1990).

AND IN SUDAN Here too slavery does not only exist but it is on the rise. Drs. Udhari Mahmoud and Suleiman Baldo published a report on the resurgence of slavery in Sudan in 1987. They write:

"Since 1986, slavery has returned in force, and is not seen by the perpetrators as illegitimate in the context of the present government war policy. The kidnapping of Dinka children, young girls, and women, their subsequent enslavement, their use in the Rizeigat economy and other spheres of life, and their exchange for money- all these are facts. The government has full knowledge of them. Indeed, the perpetrators of kidnapping and slavery have its allies in the armed militias" (Africa Watch, 1990). The government in question, was led by Sadiq el Mahdi, grandson of the legend Mahdi who revolted against the abolition of slavery in the Sudan in 1888.

THE REVIVAL OF AN OLD ARAB PRACTICE What makes slavery even more alarming is the new revival of an old Arab practice of forming large armies from slave communities. In Mauritania, thousands of slaves were forcibly recruited, armed and put under an Arab commandership, when patroling African villages in the south, where they massacre innocent people. Amnesty reported on the use of slave militia in October 1990 that:
"The Haratines who have been settled on the lands of expelled blacks have been armed by the authorities and asked to organise their own defence. AI has been informed that some authorities are profiting from the subordination ties between masters and Haratines to enrol the latter in this militia. In general this militia does not simply defend itself when attacked, but undertakes punitive expeditions against unarmed civilians living in the villages. In some cases, Haratines who object to this gratuitious violence are threatened with reprisals by the security forces who escort them on these expeditions" (Amnesty, 1990). In this way, the Haratines are misused to perform a triple function: a) fight for the Arabs their war on blacks, b) generate division and hatred between the free Africans and the slaves and c) till the stolen lands for the Arabs. This will reduce the chance for an African united front against the common enemy.

RACISM IN ECONOMIC LIFE IN MAURITANIA During colonial times, nearly all development projects where concentrated in northern Sudan, whereas most economic actvities centred in the souhern Mauritania. After independence, the northern Sudanese continued and reinforced the same trend, while in Mauritania it was a total reversal. In order to make the South poor and thus dependent on the North, Arab regimes in Mauritania decided to: - introduce Land Reforms Act no. 83.127 of June 1983 and 119/DB of 1988, used as a legal cover up to confiscate black people's farm lands along the Senegal river. As such the reform concerns only lands owned by blacks in the South. - order the deportation of tens of thousands of black farmers along the Senegal river, to Senegal and Mali. Their farm lands were immediately distributed to Arab business men or settlers from the north. - cancel plans to construct a tarred route linking Rosso with Selibaby via Boghe, Kaedi and Mbout, - construct Mauritania's only paved road that links Nouakchott to Nema in the east in such a way that it would pass only at Arab areas. This project was so important that a ministry of road was created. The present foreign minister, Hasni Ould Didi, was appointed minister of the Road in 1974. - transfer sugar industry plans from Kaedi where sugar cane is cultivated to Nouakchott in the desert, - high jack agriculture schemes planned for the South to the - burn down the pricipal market in the capital in 1981, in order to drive black businessmen out. Thus, when it was rebuilt and opened in 1985, only four black persons were allowed to do business in the whole market. One of these four odds, Sisecko, was murdered inside his shop in 1986.

AND IN SUDAN When the world's largest agriculture scheme was being built in the northern Sudan, the only development project, Zende built by the British in the South was closed down by the northern regime. Development plans in the southern Sudan, such as the Melut and Mongalla sugar industries, Ton Kengaf, Wau Brewery, Nzara and Mongalla textiles, remained on papers as development funds, were embezzled in Khartoum. In 1974 Nimeiri and Egypt decided to construct the Jonglei Canal to link the upper Nile at Bor with the White Nile below Malakal. The project was to benefit only northern Sudan and Egypt (J. Markakis, 1990). When the Chevron Company discovered oil in the South in 1987, Nimeiri attempted first to change the regional boundaries so that the oil fields would be within northern confine. When this failed, he decided that all the oil was to be piped out of the country at Port Sudan to deprive the South of any benefit connected to the discovery of black gold in black areas. (J. Garang, 1987).

DEMOCRATISATION IN MAURITANIA AND SUDAN

According to the African Traditional Constitution and Customary Laws, the people are the first and final source of all power. Thus, the rights of the community of people are superior to those of any individual, including chiefs and kings. As such, the will of the people is the supreme law, and the rulers are under this law, not above it. It follows that, rulers are the elected representatives of the people and the instruments for executing their will. Hence, government and people are one and the same, as the elder in each extended family is its chosen representative on the council. Decisions in the council are made by the elders (Ch. Williams, 1987). Therefore, major decisions of government- or the direction of policies behind these decisions- rest directly or indirectly on the freely given consent of a majority of the adult governed (S. Hook, 1988). All those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and managing them (J. Dewey, 1942)

MAURITANIA Measured against the above concepts, Mauritanians are yet to devise their own democracy. This absence of democratic experience is partly due to the fact that Mauritania is one of those "great many African countries, referred to by Larry Diamond, where "the new ruling parties eliminated political competition, more or less quickly, and established one-party regimes" (L. Diamond, 1988). Loyal to this post independence tradition, Mokhtar Ould Daddah soon abandoned the multi party system which he inherited from France for a one-party regime. Thus, from independence in 1960 to 1978, Mauritanian politics was dominated by "Parti du Peuple Mauritanien" (PPM) of President Ould Daddah (Gerteiny A.1981). Ould Daddah justified his suppression of democratic freedom, and the subsequent concentration of power in his hands by exploiting the notion of nation building, national unity and sovereignty as well as a guarantee against Morocco's territorial claim on Mauritania.

Thus, he carried out a series of constitutional changes between 1961 and 65 to repeal the post of prime minister, create a presidential system and one-party dictatorship. Ould Daddah was able to merge the "Union des Originaires de la Vallée du Fleuve Senegal" which hitherto opposed detatching Mauritania from the Mali Federation with the colonial protegé " Union Progressiste Mauritanienne" to form his own PPM. The pan-Arabist Nahda was banned as its leader, Horma Ould Babana, defected to Morocco from where he led a guerilla war against Mauritania (Jean-Louis Balans, 1979).

Ould Daddah claimed that his goal was to secure national unity, territorial integrity and international recognition of the new nation. This would open the way for economic development of the country. To this end he was able to mobilise the nation towards national unity and to gain international recognition. Mauritania was admitted into the UN on October 27th 1961, after the USSR lifted up her veto. Once this was achieved and political power centralised around his person, Ould Daddah began to reveal his dictatorial and ethnically biased ideology. The regime used Mauritania's only daily newspaper, Chaab, and radio station to give false impressions about national unity, democracy and general development which it bestowed on the people.

In reality Ould Daddah was bent on undermining the very concept of national unity, by invading the black community with the racist Arabisation Acts of 1965. These Acts provoked violent reaction on the part of black school children in January and February 1965. For the first time, both the Army and bands of slaves (Haratins) were called in to deal with civil unrest. Officialisation of Arabic was neither constitutional nor were the people consulted on its sudden and arbitrary imposition. The clashes claimed at least 6 lives, while schools had to be closed down for the rest of school year. Black intellectuals met and issued the Manifesto of the "19". They denounced the Arabisation laws as illegal and racist and called on the authorities to cancel them, set up an independent commission to deal with the national question and the issue of cohabitation between the African and Arab communities of the country. The regime's response to this call for a national dialogue was both irresponsible and violent. It resorted to blind repression against the authors of the document (Bilaal no.2, 1991).

On foreign policy, Ould Daddah rapidly moved Mauritania away from black Africa towards the Arab world. He pulled out of the "Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique" (UAM ) in July 1965, and joined the Arab League on December 4th, 1973 (Balans J.L, 1979). Unlike the OAU and its regional organisations, the Arab League and its sub-groupings are purely nationalistic blocks from which non Arabs are excluded. This policy shift towards the Arab world opened the way for an aggressive Arab scramble for Mauritania (D. Daxxel, 1989).

Having alienating the blacks, Ould Daddah set out to destroy his ethnic power base within his own Arab community. Nepotism became or Education of the Masses (SEM), to mobilise people to relay policy initiatives and to serve as a channel of communication between the regime and the people. SEM is found at all government levels down to villages and neighbourhoods. The SEM was founded in 1981 by ex-president Haidalla. It is modelled on the Libyan Popular Committees. At the start SEM mobilised people to carry out local improvement projects, to eliminate illiteracy and to discuss their grievances, and needs, which then are passed over to local authorities. The SEM has been destroyed as the regime started to use it to make people spy on each other to the extent that it created mistrust within family, community as well as between different tribes and ethnic groups. The anti-black pogroms of 1989 was organised and carried out by the leader of SEM, Rachid Ould Saleh.

AND IN SUDAN Like Mauritania, political power in Sudan has always been monopolised by narrowly based northern regimes, ever since independence in 1956. The main political parties are the Umma and Democratic Unionist Party, respectively owned by the al Mahdi and al Merghani families, the Sudan Communist Party and the National Islamic Front. None of these has been able to widen its political scope to reach out and include marginalised ethnic, regional and social groups into its rank (M. Khalid, 1990). Mansour Khalid attributes this to northern politicians' lack of will to place their loyality to a larger Sudanese community over other clashing loyalities which take account merely of one's region, cultural background or religious profession. The Umma and DUP exchanged power between 1956 and 1958 only to hand it over to the Army's chief of staff Gen. Abbud. This was a living testimony to sectarian political failure. Abbud ruled the country until he was overthrown by a popular uprising in 1964. Here again came the traditionalist parties to seize power and repeat the same policies that brought their previous regimes down. Their hold on power was interrupted once more by Nimeiri's coup in 1969. Nimeiri appeared, at first, to represent the hope of the Sudan for national unity and social justice, that could lead to real democracy.

PEACE WITH THE SOUTH Nimeiri was the first Sudanese leader who appeared to have a vision of the Sudan that goes beyond the North, the first to recognise the North/South problem of Sudan, and to look for peaceful solution to it. He thus negociated and concluded an accord with the Anya Aya Liberation Movement in Addis Ababa in March 1972. It was agreed that: 1) The three southern provinces should merge into one single region with its own legislative and executive authority to deal with internal affairs, 2) There would be a power share in the central government, 3) English was to be the main language of the South, while Arabic remained official, 4) Freedom of religion and regional control of education offered assurances of protection against enforced Arabisation, 5) A university was to be set up in Juba and African traditional laws would be respected, 6) A special development plan for the South was to be financed from central government funds and foreign aid, and 7) Southerners would be represented in the Armed forces in accordance with their share of the total population, and 6000 freedom fighters of the Anya Anya were to be absorbed into the armed forces (J. Markakis, 1990).

NIMEIRI CENTRALISED POWER AROUND HIMSELF The Addis peace treaty opened the way for Nimeiri to build his own political base after having silenced northern parties. He transformed his Revolutionary Command Council into a mass political organisation called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Sudan was proclaimed a Democratic Republic described as a socialist state founded on the alliance of the "people's active forces". A network of associations and committees was organised across the country which formed the SSU in January 1972.

Nimeiri's SSU assumed supreme political authority over all organs and activities of the state. The SSU was to "provide a facade of popular representation for the military dictatorship and an additional lever of political control. Sudan's first national constitution was proclaimed in 1973. The constitution gave Nimeiri an absolute executive power and a power to veto legislations passed by the People's Assembly. Nimeir's autocratic rule alienated his power base within the army as well as the technocrat officials, who were brought in to build up the regime because of their administrative competence and non-partisan background (Ibid).

Thus, he began falling back on the traditionalist politicians in 1977. Alliances with hitherto discredited sectarian parties, from the Umma to the Muslim Brothers were struck. As Mansour Khalid put it "Nimeiri sought power and possessed it regardless of which quarter provided his support". Increasing insecurity and ideological drought led Nimeiri to impose the draconian September (Shari'a) Laws in 1983. Like similar Shari'a laws imposed by a desperate military regime in Mauritania in 1980, there was nothing but terror (J. Garang, 1987). Religion was not the real issue, it was a tool for political ends, terror, intimidation as well as being chauvinist in application as they were primarily applied on starving poor and non-Muslim black Africans.

NIMEIRI PROVOKES THE CREATION OF SPLA In addition, Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement by dissolving the regional government and assembly successively in 1980, 81 and 83. He further, changed the boundaries of the southern provinces which he divided into three regions and ordered the transfer to Khartoum of southern soldiers. (J. Garang, 1987). Thus he provoked the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military wing SPLA in March 1983. Unlike the Anya Nya, SPLA is fighting for the total liberation of Sudan in order to create a new Sudan with which all Sudanese communities can identify and be proud of. The armed struggle in the South and popular uprising in urban centres brought Nimeiri down on April 6th 1985, while on a begging trip to the USA. The revolution was unfortunately aborted as traditionlist groups and Nimeiri's generals conspired just to repeat the scenerio of 1964. One year later, Northern factions were ruling in Khartoum while the war in the South was raging and famine killing and cripling millions of Sudanese.

Again, sectarian parties in Khartoum failed to form any effective government, which together with the war in the South and law breakdown in the centre, the Army showed up again to "save" the nation from her hopeless politicians. Gen. el Bashir stepped into power on June 30th, 1989. Like Nimeiri allied with the communist party in 1969 in order to take power, el Bashir has found an ally in the National Islamic Front. The power shift was met with some relief because of what Mansour Khalid described as a "sheer disillusionment with discredited regimes, which but a few years earlier had appeared to represent the ultimate salvation for the nation, that led the Sudanese to recreate the political nightmare of their past in order to rid themselves of the latest "saviours" (Khalid, 1990).

MAURITANIA The Mauritanian government does not admit the existence of any ethnic problems in the country. The whole problem is with Senegal where black "criminals" are being trained, armed and then sent across the River to raid in Mauritania! As to democracy, in a speech to mark the end of Ramadan on April 15th 1991, Taya announced that free elections would be held on a new constitution, and opposition parties legalised before the elections later this year. In an interview with Le Monde on 8.5.91, Taya said: " the new constitution would be prepared by the CMSN aided by jurists and that there was no question about involving opposition groups in the process. Because these are merely brawlers, exiled and jobless, who publish and distribute leaflets. He said that he had not introduce democracy earlier because the people were not politically matured enough. "You can't just throw someone who cannot swim into the water" (Le Monde 8.5.1991). On June 11th Taya presented a draft constitution to be adopted in a referendum on July 12th. The proposed constitution stipulates that Mauritania is an Islamic, Arab and African Republic whose national languages are Arabic, Fulani, Soninke and Wolof whereby Arabic is the official. It envigages a powerful presidential system. The president is elected for a renewable six year periods. He appoints and dismisses the prime minister. Legislative functions shall reside with a senate and parliament (Projet de constitution, 1991).

SUDAN Gen. el Bashir is busy working on the creation of Islamic popular committees, which he hopes would work as a political facade and ideological base for his fundamentalist regime. The move was announced by Bashir himself on April 29th 1991 (Afrique Asie, 6/1991). The committees are to be modeled on that of Libya. Plans to unite Sudan with Libya by 1994 are under way. Unlike Taya, el Bashir recognises the existence of civil war in Sudan and has sought Nigerian mediation to negociate without preconditions with SPLA.

FLAM AND SPLA Historical injustice against Africans in Mauritania and Sudan, led to the creation of SPLA and FLAM in 1983. Though originated in the South, where anti-black pogroms have surpassed that of South Africa, FLAM and SPLA have shown themselves to be national both in character and objectives. Both movements are committed to the total liberation of their respective nations and to the unity of their peoples and the territorial integrity of their nations. As such, they are fighting in order to eradicate racism, slavery, social and cultural chauvinism as well as put an end to social and economic injustice so as to build new secular nations based on the objective conditions. They advocate a federal system of government that would enable each region to exercise real power for its economic and social development and the promotion and development of their respective cultural values within their nations. They are determined to devise a political mechanism that will end the monopoly of power by any group of self-seeking individuals whatever their ethnic or social background, whether they come in the uniform of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers.

Both FLAM and SPLA object to both military and union pacts with Arab countries, as that will necessarily be against the interest of one of the various communities of the nations. Domestic and foreign policies should reflect national realities to serve national interests. Sudan and Mauritania will thus contribute to fruitful Afro-Arab cooperation and solidarity which will set the example for good neighbourhood as well as South-South solidarity. Afro-Arab relations should not only be limited to the amount of petro-cash that oil sheikhs spit into the pockets of African leaders, who in return lend lip service to the Palestinian cause. For a real democracy to be achieved FLAM and SPLA demand: 1. the present regimes be replaced by interim governments in which each and every community is equally represented 2. national constitutional forums be set up to work out appropriate forms of government, political and legal systems. 3. free elections be organised, 4. State of emergency be lifted up. 5. SPLA demands the abolition of the so-called Islamic laws imposed by Nimeiri in September 1983, whereas FLAM demands the return to their homes of the 200 000 black Mauritanian deportees from Senegal or Mali, and setting up of an independent commission to investigate the death of 457 black prisoners in government custody in Nov. 90-Feb. 1991 and to bring the guilty to justice.

- A ban of old political activists, who have abused their power.
- Zoning of national offices so that the presidency, speaker of national parliament, president of supreme court, prime minister and army chief of staff would be held in rotation among the different ethnic groups, as a constitutional imperative. - A ban on foreign cash contribution to political parties.
- A demonstration of national support in achieving political position, a minimum of 30% supports in the major ethnic groups. Or the idea that Uganda was going to operate in 1971 (aborted by Amin's coup), which was that individual candidates be put up in two geographical constituencies and be required then to demonstrate a degree of support in both (Peter Wooward, 1988).
- The ethnic distribution in both Sudan and Mauritania is roughly 50-50.
Ethnic share in all national organs should be at least 40%. Such system should also apply on men/women.
- Having a provision in the constitutions that defines the place of the army: To make it illegal for a civilian governments to use the national army for police job, and in return, make military coups illegal under whatever pretext.
- National organs should use and promote major national languages equally, whereas regional institutions use their respective laguages in such a way that cooperation amongst different cultural elements be promoted. - A regional treaty to define and regulate Afro-Arab relations along the Sahel region should be worked out.
Some may consider this to be both unrealistic and too expensive. But would it be more unrealistic and costly than the civil wars, political instability and dictatorship that have been haunting Mauritania and Sudan since their birth as nations?

Africa South of the Sahara,(1991).Sudan, London

Africa Watch,(1990).Mauritania:Ten Years After the Last Abolition of Slavery,London.

Afrique Asie,6/91,(1991).Sudan, Paris.

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Paris.

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Studies, Beirut.

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* APPENDIX

MY COUSIN MOHANED

By
S. Anai Kelueljan

Listen!
You Mohamed and I
Are not brothers,
You're the son of my aunt-
You're my cousin!

Long ago your Arab father came,
Also he came with the Holy Koran
And his traditional ways,
But without a mistress or a wife!

Your father came to live among friends,

Not his slaves,
For the Africans are always generous
And useful friends
Until they are offended by despising
Their traditional ways...

So despise his colour, or creed,
Your father was free
To surround himself with lovely maids,
And then he began to study
The existing tribes and clans,
And concluded that Arab
Was culturally and racially superior
To the African Man!

So, he proceeded to propagate Islam
Along with his traditional ways.
Islam and Arabism
The jihad (holy war) men thought invincible!

But all the Africans,
Those men who were charcoal black
From every tribe and clan
Came and assembled,
They fixed their vision on gigantic idea
To survive collectively...

They said to themselves:
"If the Arabs have come to claim
This African Land,
No doubt they will have it pretty rough!"

But then,
Continuing their assault
The Arabs wiped out thousands of the African males,
And took the women as their slaves
With whom they freely mated!

This is the version of the story
Of conflict between the Africans and Arabs
The Arab historians do not tell.

And so,
You cousin Mohamed in the Northern Sudan
Are an offspring of my slave-aunt,
Who in her wretchedness stooped to conquer
By blood strength...
A reality as large as the Imatong mountain!

Your are no longer
A pure Arab, like your father,
You are the hybrid of Africa,
The generous product
Of many years of bloody wars
On the African Land
Your African Motherland!

My cousin Mohamed
Thinks he's very clever...
With pride,
He says he's an African who speaks
Arabic language,
Because he's no mother tongue!
Again, he says,
It is civilized to speak Arabic!

Among the Arabs,
My cousin becomes a militant Arab-
A black Arab,
Who rejects the definition of race
By pigment of one's skin.

He says,
If an African speaks Arabic language
He's an Arab!
If an African is culturally Arabized
He's an Arab!

My cousin claims
That Islamic religion is a property
Of the Arabs!
He says,
God revealed the Holy Koran in Arabic..
And it cannot be translated
To other languages, Because God has forbidden so!

He says,
Muslims must know Arabic
Because it is the language of the Holy Koran,
And the Holy Koran is the vehicle
For the Arab culture,
Because the Arabs are God-chosen people!

My cousin says,
The Africans have no culture!
The Africans have no history!
The Africans have no religion!
The Africans have no language!
The Africans are uncivilized!

He says, it is his duty to extend
The Arab sphere of influence
Into Africa!

He claims that,
Egypt is already Arab!
Libya is already Arab!
Tunisia is already Arab!
Algeria is already Arab!
Morocco is already Arab!
Mauritania is already Arab!
Somalia is already Arab!
Djebuti is already Arab!
Sudan is already Arab!
and soon,
Western Sahara shall be Arab!
Eritrea shall be Arab!
And if God's willing,
Ethiopia shall be Arab!
Let the whole African continent,
Become an Arab continent,
So that its people can be civilized!

My cousin is deafened
By Orouba (Arabism):
To be an Arab is right!
To be a muslim is right!
If an Arab/muslim kills you during jihad,
He has secured his place in paradise!
If you kill him,
All the same, he goes to heaven
For furthering Islamic cause!
In other words,
My cousin wins both ways!

His opponent has no alternative,
But to submit!

And so,
Like Zionism, or Apartheid,
Orouba has become a racist ideology!

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Last updated on April 9, 2003

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